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A PROSECUTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
HONORABLE MICHAEL

R. JUVILER*

Thank you. It was a privilege thirty-one years ago to appear
before the Justices whose clerks are here and with the distinguished lawyers whom you've just heard from, and it's a privilege to be on a panel with them now.
I'd like to take you back thirty-one years to the perspective
of a litigator preparing for the Supreme Court, and then come
back to the current perspective of a trial judge who has been
applying the Terry1 case and the cases decided after it.
It was a daunting task to defend the right of the police to
stop and frisk persons abroad on the public streets on less than
probable cause, and a daunting task to defend the validity of
those actions taken under a New York State statute which recently had been enacted.2 You must remember that at the time
of the Terry argument, the exclusionary rule was very new in
New York, in Ohio, and in many other states.3 There was no experience of any substance applying Fourth Amendment law in a
state prosecutor's office. We were like second-year law students
* Acting Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York, and Judge of the
Court of Claims. Adjunct Professor, St. John's University School of Law. Swarthmore College (B.A., 1956), Yale University (LL.B., 1960). As Deputy Chief of the Appeals Bureau, New York County District Attorney's Office, Judge Juviler argued, as
amicus curiae, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), one of Terry's companion
cases.
' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 Act of Mar. 2, 1964, ch. 86, sec. 2, § 180-a, 1964 N.Y. Laws 111 (codified
at
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50
(McKinney 1992)) (authorizing a police officer or peace officer to stop any individual
who the officer "reasonably suspects.. .is committing, has committed or is about to
commit" a crime and to search that person if the officer "reasonably suspects that he
is in danger of physical injury").
3 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that defendants' constitutional
rights under the Fourth Amendment required that the exclusionary rule be applicable to the states); see also Jerry E. Norton, The ExclusionaryRule Reconsidered:
Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (1998) (discussing justification for the exclusionary rule); Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond
Probable Cause, Beyond the FourthAmendment: New Strategies for FightingPretext
Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 730 n.58 (1998) (discussing Mapp v. Ohio).
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preparing to argue a historic case before the Supreme Court. We
had had no occasion to study in detail the law of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Three themes appeared to us as we prepared.
The first was that in the brief six years under the exclusionary rule, we had been trained and developed in a culture of probable cause. We knew from probable cause. We didn't know from
reasonable suspicion. There was considerable skepticism in our
office about our ability to properly uphold the new law. There
was skepticism when the Rivera4 case, which Mr. Payne has referred to, was argued in our highest court in New York, and
when the stop and frisk in that case, undertaken without
authority of the statute, was upheld.5
The second theme that emerged in our preparation was the
theme of race. It was as apparent in 1967 as it is now that street
encounters between police officers and citizens are disproportionately burdensome to members of minority groups and have
caused considerable resentment.6
The third problem that emerged was the problem of police
credibility. What if Detective McFadden had testified in a New
York court? Some Detective McFaddens would have said not
only what the real Detective McFadden said, but also, "[wiell, actually I also saw a bulge on Mr. Terry, and then there was a
bulge on Mr. Chilton, and yes, I have had experience making arrests for persons casing stores." The dramatic increase in cases
known as "dropsy" cases shortly after Mapp v. Ohio7 and its exclusionary rule was what gave rise to our concerns as officers of
the court. Before Mapp, the gamblers or addicts would have the
contraband in their mouths or on their persons, and this stuff
was seized from the suspects' mouths or waistbands, but in 1961,
after Mapp, the criminal community started much more than before to drop these items to the ground, abandoning them and
People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32 (N.Y. 1964).
5 See id. (holding that police officers have both a duty to prevent crime and a
right to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to themselves, and that a stop
and frisk does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches).
6 See generally, Arthur H. Garrison, DisproportionateMinority Arrest: A Note
on What Has Been Said and How It Fits Together, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 29 (1997).
7 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that any evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search and seizure is inadmissible in state court).
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obviating probable cause.
Our first determination was to urge a theory of proportionality.8 At that time it was relatively simple: An officer needs less
information and reliability of information to stop and frisk than
to arrest, and there is a need to stop and frisk. We sought to
document this in our written argument and in a long appendix to
the brief.9 The strategy here was to write the obverse of Mr.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in the recent Miranda'° case,
which was replete with examples from police training manuals
and actual cases of the abuses of station-house interrogation.
We tried to show by use of actual cases what Professor Amar refers to in his paper, to be presented later in this conference, as
the good Terry-to show the need for the stop and the need for
the frisk."
With respect to race, we spent nine pages in our brief addressing that problem. Our statistics on the application of the
stop-and-frisk law were gathered from 1600 police reports required by the New York City Police Department for stops or
frisks. They showed the disproportionate racial impact of those
actions. One of the strengths of the Terry opinion is that it directly addresses the impact of its ruling on race relations.1 2 It
also points out, as we did in our brief, the limits of what the exclusionary rule can accomplish in this area."
Now I'd like to stand here as a judge who for nineteen years
in the trial court has been applying Terry and its subsequent
cases, and to look back from that perspective.
After the Terry opinions were filed, we felt perhaps like the
8 Proportionality has been described as a reasonable balance between the severity of an act and the severity of the resulting response to the act, or alternatively,
"let[ting] the punishment fit the crime." Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24 (1997) (stating that a wrongdoer
has a legitimate expectation that any punishment will be proportional to the wrong
committed).
9 See Brief of District Attorney of New York County, Amicus Curiae, Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (No. 67-63).
'0 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court decided that standard methods of police interrogation created an atmosphere of intimidation and that no evidence obtained through custodial interrogation would be admissible unless the suspect was first apprised of his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 444-45.
n See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples,72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998).
12 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 n.11 (1968).
'3 See id. at 13-15.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:741

makers of the hydrogen bomb. What had we created? What had
we contributed to? Would this lead to further racial divisions,
police abuse, police "testi-lying?" And so we addressed one of
these problems shortly thereafter, in a case before our Court of
Appeals which I urge you to read, People v. Berrios.4 We asked
the Court of Appeals to put the burden of proof and persuasion
on the prosecution at hearings on motions to suppress evidence
that is obtained by warrantless searches and seizures."5 We lost
that request by one vote. 6 The federal standards of proof and
persuasion, at least in the Second Circuit, appear to be different
from ours in New York, and that may be an area for possible litigation for you lawyers.'
Thirty years after Terry we are in essentially the same
situation in New York that we were in before Mapp: And, that is
that the decisions of the federal courts under the Fourth
Amendment are almost irrelevant to our work as state judges.
That is because our highest court has developed rules under the
New York State version of the Fourth Amendment that differ
from the federal courts' interpretation of the federal Fourth
Amendment and give greater rights to suspects and apply
greater limitations on the police. 8 Briefly, these are some ex14

270 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that the burden of proving the legality of

a seizure would not shift to the prosecution in a warrantless search and seizure
case).
15See id. at 712.
1'6See id. at 714-16 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Judge Fuld
noted that the risk of officers' fabricating testimony was not limited to traditional
"dropsy" cases, i.e., where the arresting officer claims that the suspect dropped the
seized evidence. See id. at 714. Rather, such a risk is generally present in the warrantless prosecution of narcotics and gambling cases. See id. at 715. Therefore, Fuld
argued, the burden should shift to the prosecution to prove that the seizure did not
violate the suspect's constitutional rights. See id. at 716.
17 See United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1973) (holding that when a
search is conducted without a warrant, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
that the suspect voluntarily consented to the search or that the search was incident
to an arrest and was necessary to ensure the officer's safety); United States v.
Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the prosecution has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence gathered
through a warrantless search and seizure is admissible).
'8 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. For information on the evolution of the exclusionary rule in New York, see PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 59 (1991). Section 12 of New York's state constitution,
adopted in 1938, mirrors the language of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See id. New York legislators, however, refused to adopt an exclusionary rule during the 1938 convention. See id.; see also Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism:The New York State Court of
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amples:
With respect to proportionality, the New York Court of Appeals has defined three levels of police information and intrusion
short of arrest,19 whereas in federal courts after Terry there is
one level short of arrest, reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk.20
A second example is that in New York a chase, a pursuit of a
suspect, is a "seizure," and it requires reasonable suspicion.2 1
The Supreme Court has held that a pursuit is not a seizure and
requires no level of information.2 2 A third important distinction
is that in New York if the court finds that the stopping of a car
for a traffic offense was a pretext for a criminal investigation,
the evidence is suppressed.' The Supreme Court has said that if
Appeals Quest for PrincipledDecisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 86-94 (1996).
After the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, New York's Code of Criminal Procedure (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.20 (McKinney 1995))
was amended to provide the same protection as that afforded by the Fourth
Amendment of the federal constitution. See id at 105. In People v. Bigelow, 488
N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985), the New York Court of Appeals recognized a constitutional
basis to the exclusionary rule when it rejected the "Good Faith" exception allowed in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See Pitler at 150-153.
"' See People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). The Court of Appeals first
defined the levels of police interference and their corresponding standards of belief
in De Bour. See id. The lowest level is "approaching to request information[, which]
is permissible when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not
necessarily indicative of criminality." Id. at 571-72. If an officer has a "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" the officer has the "common-law right to inquire," which is a level of interference slightly greater than the approach to request
information yet 'short of a forcible seizure." Id. at 572. The stop and frisk requires
that the officer have a "reasonable suspicion." Id. In order to make an arrest, an officer must have "probable cause." Id. The court reaffirmed this gradation in People
v. Hollman, recognizing that the distinction between an approach to request information and the common-law right of inquiry is a subtle one. See People v. Hollman,
590 N.E.2d 204, 209-10 (N.Y. 1992).
20 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (holding that
"mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure" and, therefore, does not require suspicion). But see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (holding that "brief
investigatory stops" constitute "seizures of the person" and "some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity").
21 See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 606 N.E.2d 951, 952 (N.Y. 1992)
(determining
that reasonable suspicion is required to justify pursuit for the purpose of detaining
someone); People v. Leung, 497 N.E.2d 687, 688 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the
'objective credible reason' " that justified the officers' approach was transformed
into reasonable suspicion when the suspect fled, justifying the officers' pursuit of the
suspect) (citation omitted). Cf People v. Howard, 408 N.E.2d 908, 910 (N.Y. 1980)
(dismissing the indictment and questioning the reasonableness of the pursuit, initiated when the defendant ran from the police when questioned).
22 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (finding that a seizure is an actual physical restraint and, therefore, a pursuit cannot be a seizure).
See, e.g., People v. David, 636 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376-77 (App. Div. 1996); People v.
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there was an objective basis to stop a motor vehicle for a traffic
infraction, the motivation of the officer is not pertinent.2
The problem of credibility of police witnesses has continued
and, 31 years later, is now viewed by this speaker from the
viewpoint of a trier of fact. My judicial colleagues and I have
difficult jobs, because if we suppress the evidence incorrectly, we
may be wrongly accusing one person, a police officer-witness, of
peijury and may be letting a guilty person go free. The obverse
is obvious-we may mistakenly accept false testimony and condone an unlawful search and seizure.
There is an aspect of street-encounter law that has not been
mentioned in the papers that I've read that will be submitted in
this wonderful conference. One of your speakers to come, Professor Amar, has suggested that juries in civil cases can enforce
the Terry stop-and-frisk requirements--enforce the limitations
on the police set forth in the Terry opinion.25 I have found that
juries in criminal trials have "enforced" those limitations when
they are not an issue for the jury. They "enforce" them by rejecting police testimony relating to the substantive crime-such as
possession of a gun or drugs-if they doubt the credibility of the
testimony about how the evidence was obtained. After the O.J.
Simpson criminal trial (does anyone remember that case?), I
theorized that the jury was bothered by the testimony of the investigating officers that while they were climbing the fence and
gathering evidence at the Simpson home, O.J. Simpson was not
a suspect. That's an example of the trier of fact for the criminal
charges carrying the fact-finding back to how the evidence was
gathered. I have seen cases in my court in which, I have theorized, the jury rejected the criminal charges because it rejected
the testimony on how the street encounter with the defendant
took place, even though that did not directly cast doubt on
whether, say, the alleged bulge in the defendant's coat really was
the gun in evidence, People's Exhibit 1.
Ynoa, 636 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890-91 (App. Div. 1996), appeal denied, 666 N.E.2d 1075
(N.Y. 1996); People v. Roundtree, 651 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615-16 (App. Div. 1996), appeal
denied, 681 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y. 1997); People v. James, 630 N.Y.S.2d 176, 176-77
(App. Div. 1995); People v. Llopis, 509 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (App. Div. 1986). But see
People v. McCoy, 657 N.Y.S.2d 437 (App. Div. 1997), appeal denied, 690 N.E.2d 498
(N.Y. 1997) (holding that although officer's stop of suspect for actual traffic violation
was pretextual, the evidence would not be suppressed).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-14 (1996).
25 See Amar, supra note 11.
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I suggest that the exclusionary rule still is not a suitable
device for preventing racial discrimination in street law enforcement. In my view, the most effective remedy has not been
mentioned in the papers that are being submitted, because it's
not within the scope of this conference. That is the vote. For
members of groups who find that they are in their view victimized by over-aggressive police conduct, the greatest remedy is the
ballot box.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

